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I. INTRODUCTION
Managed care was designed to bring stability and balance to healthcare delivery
in the United States, but its experience in the legal system has involved only
moderate stability and very little balance. There has been a trend toward broad
deference to the industry, so that managed care organizations (MCOs) are largely
immune from liability.] At the same time, some courts have suggested that the entire
managed care model rests on sketchy legal ground.2 Meanwhile, commentators have
disagreed on such fundamental questions as whether legal disputes arising under
managed care should be resolved according to contract law or tort law.3 Moreover,
the extent to which the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)4
governs, or moots, patients' claims against MCOs has never been entirely clear-and
t B.A., Yale University, 1993; J.D., M.P.P., University of Michigan, 1999.
: Associate Professor, University of Michigan School of Public Health.
See, e.g., Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 260 (1993) (reading statutory provisions
narrowly to allow only very limited remedies against MCOs); Reinert v. Giorgio Foods, Inc., 15 F.
Supp. 2d 589, 595 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (employing very deferential review of a decision to deny benefits
and an interpretation of plan terms); Weiss v. Cigna Healthcare, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 748 (S.D.N.Y.
1997). See generally Peter D. Jacobson & Scott D. Pomfret, Establishing New Legal Doctrine in
Managed Care: A Model of Judicial Response to Industrial Change, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 813,
844-50 (1999) (describing courts' willingness to defer or grant immunity to MCOs in various contexts).
2 See, e.g., Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 49, 52-53 (D. Mass. 1997);
Pomeroy v. Johns Hopkins Med. Servs., Inc., 868 F. Supp. 110, 116-17 (D. Md. 1994). The lower court
in Pegram adopted such a view. See Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362, 375-78 (7th Cir. 1998), rev'd,
530 U.S. 211 (2000).
3 See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO HEALTH
CARE? (1997); CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICES: PRIVATE CONTRACTS AS
INSTRUMENTS OF HEALTH REFORM (1995) (discussing the application of contract law); Patricia M.
Danzon, Tort Liability: A Minefield for Managed Care?, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 491 (1997); Clark C.
Havighurst, Making Health Plans Accountable for the Quality of Care, 31 GA. L. REV. 587 (1997);
Peter D. Jacobson & Neena M. Patil, Managed Care Litigation. Legal Doctrine at the Boundary of Tort
and Contract, 57 MED. CARE RES. & REV. 440 (2000) (discussing the tort-contract debate). For
alternative views, see generally P.S. Atiyah, Medical Malpractice and the Contract/Tort Boundary, 49
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 287 (1986); Catherine G. McLaughlin & Paul B. Ginsburg, Competition,
Quality of Care, and the Role of the Consumer, 76 MILBANK Q. 737 (1998).
4 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
422 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE VOL. 27 NO. 4 2001
because ERISA controls a vast number of health insurance plans,5 this legal issue is
extremely significant.
Given this atmosphere of uncertainty and debate, many observers awaited
anxiously-in every sense of that word-the Supreme Court's decision in Pegram v.
Herdrich.6 The plaintiff in that case, Cynthia Herdrich, had complained of abdominal
pain to her physician, Lori Pegram, who practiced under Herdrich's managed care
plan with Carle Clinic Association.7 Pegram noticed a large inflammation, but
instead of ordering an immediate ultrasound test at a local hospital, decided to
arrange for the test to be performed eight days later at a more distant hospital
overseen by Carle. In the interim, Herdrich's appendix ruptured, causing peritonitis.
Herdrich sued Carle and Pegram in state court for medical malpractice and
fraud. After the defendants removed the case to federal court and successfully
asserted that ERISA preempted Herdrich's fraud claims, Herdrich added a new claim
under ERISA. She argued that she was not provided with an ultrasound diagnosis in
a timely manner because the plan's financial incentives gave physicians a financial
stake in limiting care, thus breaching the plan's and the physician's fiduciary duty to
act in the patient's best interests. Herdrich won a jury award of $35,000 on her
malpractice claims, but the district court dismissed her ERISA claim. She appealed,
and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for trial, rejecting
Carle's argument that allowing patients to challenge the use of financial incentives
would destroy managed care.8 Judge Flaum's vigorous, and rigorous, dissent 9-and
later, Judge Easterbrook's even more vehement dissent from denial of a rehearing en
banclO-practically begged the Supreme Court to review and overturn the decision.
The Court obliged, granting certiorari1 I and ultimately reversing the Court of
Appeals.12
Justice Souter's opinion, written on behalf of a unanimous Court, offers
preliminary discussions as to three categories of relevant background, and then
analyzes the legal question before the Court. The first background discussion relates
to the managed care industry. The opinion describes how managed care operates and
outlines its rise as a common model for American healthcare delivery. The opinion
5 Estimates differ as to the number of patients enrolled in MCOs governed by ERISA, but it is
clear that the number is substantial. See, e.g., Heather Hutchinson, The Managed Care Plan
Accountability Act, 32 IND. L. REV. 1383, 1385 (1999) ("Today, over forty-five million Americans are
enrolled in MCOs and ERISA governs the majority of those plans.") (citing Laura H. Harshbarger,
Note, ERISA Preemption Meets the Age of Managed Care: Toward a Comprehensive Social Policy, 47
SYRACUSE L. REV. 191, 192 (1996)); Joan H. Krause, The Brief Life of the Gag Clause: Why Anti-Gag
Clause Legislation Isn't Enough, 67 TENN. L. REV. 1, 18 (1999) (referring to "the approximately fifty-
one million Americans whose health plans are governed by, ERISA"); John P. Little, Note, Managed
Care Contracts of Adhesion: Terminating the Doctor-Patient Relationship and Endangering Patient
Health, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1397, 1468 n.467 (1997) ("One hundred twenty million people are
enrolled in MCOs that are covered by ERISA.") (citing Robert Pear, H.M.O.s Using Federal Law to
Deflect Malpractice Suits, N.Y. TiMES, Nov. 17, 1996, at A24).
6 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
7 For discussion of the background facts provided in this paragraph and the following
paragraph, see generally Pegram, 530 U.S. at 215-17 (providing a detailed description of the facts and
the procedural history of the case); Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362, 365 n.1-367 (7th Cir. 1998)
(describing the events that led Herdrich to file a suit alleging professional medical negligence).
8 Pegram, 154 F.3d at 380.
9 See id. (Flaum, J., dissenting).
10 See Herdrich v. Pegram, 170 F.3d 683 (7th Cir. 1999) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc).
I1 Pegram v. Herdrich, 527 U.S. 1068 (1999).
12 Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
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then notes the specific nature of the Carle HMO, 13 in which Herdrich was enrolled,
but finds that it would be inappropriate to make a specific judgment "purporting to
draw a line between good and bad HMOs,"'14 as "courts are not in a position to derive
a sound legal principle to differentiate an HMO like Carle from other HMOs."' 5
The second background discussion deals with the relevant law, ERISA, as
elucidated by underlying trust-law principles and as interpreted by prior Court
decisions. ERISA defines "fiduciary" to include someone who acts as an
administrator for a plan;' 6 ERISA fiduciaries are required to act "solely in the interest
of the participants and beneficiaries" of the plan.' 7 The Supreme Court previously
had read this language to incorporate the duties imposed on fiduciaries under the
common law of trusts.18 The Pegram opinion points out, however, that "Beyond the
threshold statement of responsibility ... the analogy between ERISA fiduciary and
common law trustee becomes problematic."' 19 The ERISA fiduciary may have a more
complex relationship with beneficiaries than would a traditional trustee; for example,
the fiduciary may also be the beneficiaries' employer. Partly for this reason,
ERISA's "fiduciary" label does not truly relate to persons so much as to acts. When
and "to the extent" 20 that a person engages in specified acts, such as plan
administration, ERISA's fiduciary duties will apply; in other situations, they will not.
The final background discussion focuses on the nature of Herdrich's claim,
which the opinion describes as "difficult to understand." 21 Herdrich did not base her
claim on any specific act or decision.2 2 Rather, Herdrich asserted that Carle's general
incentive scheme created an inherent conflict of interest that amounted to a breach of
fiduciary duty.
All this left the Court, therefore, with two questions to answer: which specific
acts was Herdrich alleging to be fiduciary acts under ERISA, and was that allegation
accurate? The Court characterizes the decisions in question as "mixed" decisions,
involving elements of both plan administration and patient care, and concludes that
"Congress did not intend Carle or any other HMO to be treated as a fiduciary to the
extent that it makes mixed eligibility decisions acting through its physicians." 23 The
Court concludes that Pegram's decision regarding Herdrich's care was not fiduciary
and therefore did not fall within ERISA's ambit; accordingly, Herdrich's claim must
be rejected.
We have argued elsewhere that, as a general matter, a legal regime rooted in the
concept of fiduciary duties might provide a useful model for analyzing managed care
disputes. 24 In doing so, we noted, but did not explore, the possibility of reading
13 HMO stands for "health maintenance organization," a term that refers to a type of MCO, but
is often used synonymously with the term "MCO."
14 Pegram, 530 U.S. at 221.
Is Id. at 222.
16 See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(iii) (1994).
17 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1994).
18 See, e.g., Cent. States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Cent. Transp., Inc., 472 U.S. 559,
570 (1985) ("[Rlather than explicitly enumerating all of the powers and duties of trustees and other
fiduciaries, Congress invoked the common law of trusts to define the general scope of their authority
and responsibility.").
19 Pegram, 530 U.S. at 225.
20 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A).
21 Pegram, 530 U.S. at 226.
22 For this reason, as the opinion notes, Herdrich's claim "could have been brought, and would
have been no different, if Herdrich had never had a sick day in her life." Id.
23 Id. at 231.
24 See Peter D. Jacobson & Michael T. Cahill, Applying Fiduciary Duties in the Managed Care
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ERISA to employ such a model. 25  Part II of this essay argues that a proper
interpretation of ERISA does place fiduciary duties at the heart of its framework for
judicial review, and that Pegram was therefore wrongly decided. In doing so, Part II
explains the practical and conceptual difficulties that may have led the Pegram Court
to hold as it did.
Part III discusses the negative' implications of Pegram. Essentially, the Supreme
Court missed an opportunity to enable the use of ERISA to resolve managed care's
serious allocative tradeoffs using a fiduciary-duty model of the kind we have
proposed. Indeed, the decision effectively eliminates the possibility that federal
courts can, or will, review MCOs' decisions about such tradeoffs at all, as Pegram
found that such decisions do not fall within ERISA.
Part IV considers what, if anything, can be done after Pegram to maintain a
balanced and significant role for the government, specifically the courts, in
overseeing MCOs' decisions. Most obviously, because Pegram resolved only the
federal ERISA question, there remains the possibility of using substantive state law-
such as state common law regarding fiduciary duties-to develop a model for sound
judicial review. In fact, because ERISA's remedies are extremely limited vis-a-vis
the remedies that might be available under state law, 26 it may well be more desirable
for such review to develop under state law-assuming, that is, that ERISA does not
preempt states' potential to develop such models. Part IV also explores other
methods that might enable development of a fiduciary-duty-based model such as we
have proposed.
II. PITFALLS
It is hard to argue with Pegram's direct judgment rejecting Herdrich's argument
on appeal. Before the Supreme Court, Herdrich put forth a claim that challenged the
entire HMO structure rather than any specific decision. 27  Such a generalized
allegation clearly does not make out a legitimate claim. It might make sense to argue
that a particular decision reflected unlawful disloyalty or lack of care, but Herdrich's
claim would require a determination that any mixed decision under Carle's scheme
was a breach of fiduciary duty per se. Under such a broad rule, any decision to deny,
delay or limit care-even if completely medically justified-would potentially
subject a physician or plan to liability. 28
Although the Pegram Court quite possibly reached the right final disposition-a
Context, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 155 (2000).
25 See id. at 163 ("To date, courts have not defined the meaning of ERISA's fiduciary duty
provision."); id. at 171 ("[The Jacobson & Cahill model] may usefully describe the proper implications
of ERISA's undefined imposition of a fiduciary role on plan administrators.").
26 Recovery under ERISA is usually limited to restoring the dollar value of the benefits denied
under the plan-say, the actual price of a procedure that a patient did not receive-whereas state-law
tort damages may include awards for various costs and damages resulting from the patient's failure to
obtain care in a timely fashion. See, e.g., Arnold J. Rosoff, Breach of Fiduciary Duty Lawsuits Against
MCOs: What's Left After Pegram v. Herdrich?, 22 J. LEGAL MED. 55, 61-62 (2001).
27 See Pegram, 530 U.S. at 232 ("First, we need to ask how this fiduciary standard would affect
HMOs if it applied as Herdrich claims it should be applied, not directed against any particular mixed
decision that injured a patient, but against HMOs that make mixed decisions in the course of providing
medical care for profit.").
28 This is one of the central problems with the myriad class-action lawsuits now being filed
against the managed care industry. Some of these suits, such as Maio v. Aetna. Inc., 221 F.3d 472 (3d
Cir. 2000), generally allege fraud in the operation of managed care without providing specific instances
of how the fraud actually undermines healtheare delivery. Courts have not been amenable to allowing
such unspecified challenges to proceed. See id. (affirming dismissal of complaint).
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reversal of the Seventh Circuit's holding in Herdrich's favor-various aspects of its
underlying reasoning are questionable. Section II.A contends that the Court failed to
apply ERISA's own definition of what decisions are fiduciary in nature. Instead, the
Court looked beyond ERISA to general trust-law principles, doing so in a way that
contravened both ERISA and a previous Court decision. Section II.B argues that,
although the facts may support the ultimate judgment in Pegram, the, Court went
further than was necessary to reach that result, thereby-perhaps inadvertently-
addressing important but peripheral issues without exploring their implications fully.
A. WHAT ACTS ARE FIDUCIARY? NEGLECTING ERISA AND VARITY
Normally, the law imposes fiduciary duties on certain actors who stand in a
particular relation to someone else. For example, agents have a fiduciary duty to
their principals, 29 and lawyers have a fiduciary duty to their clients.30 But as noted
above, because ERISA plan administrators sometimes have complicated relationships
with plan participants, some aspects of which do not entail fiduciary obligations,
ERISA imposes fiduciary duties on the performance of certain enumerated actions.
Specifically, ERISA says that acts are fiduciary when they involve exercise of
"discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of a
plan."31
Accordingly, in Pegram, the Court correctly noted that the first step in
addressing Herdrich's claim for breach of fiduciary duty was to decide whether the
acts she challenged were subject to ERISA's fiduciary rules in the first place. In
ascertaining which managed care decisions should be considered fiduciary for ERISA
purposes, the Court first drew a distinction between two types of decisions that
managed care entities must routinely make:
What we will call pure "eligibility decisions" turn on the plan's
coverage of a particular condition or medical procedure for its
treatment. "Treatment decisions," by contrast, are choices about
how to go about diagnosing and treating a patient's condition:
given a patient's constellation of symptoms, what is the appropriate
medical response?32
The Court then noted, correctly, that "[tihese decisions are often practically
inextricable from one another," 33 so nearly all actual decisions that MCOs make are
"mixed decisions" implicating both the administrative and medical functions of the
MCO.34
Pegram concludes that when an MCO or its agent makes a decision that
involves both administration of the ERISA benefits plan and the proper course of
medical treatment-a so-called "mixed decision"-that MCO or agent is not acting as
a fiduciary. The Pegram opinion strongly suggests that only "pure eligibility
determinations" can be challenged for fiduciary breach under ERISA.35
Under the ERISA definition quoted above, however, pure eligibility decisions
often do not implicate a fiduciary duty, because they,.do not involve any genuine
29 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2001).
30 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16 (1998).
31 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(iii).
32 Pegram, 530 U.S. at 228.
33 Id. at 228.
34 See id. at 228-29.
35 See id. at 230-31.
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discretion. Pure eligibility decisions, as defined by Pegram, involve examination of
the terms of the contract itself, and an administrator has no "discretion" to interpret
those terms when their meaning is plain,36 even if the plan itself gives the fiduciary
"discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms
of the plan." 37 That is to say, the courts would not, and should not, treat an arguably
'reasonable" decision that-conflicted with the plan's plain terms as a "discretionary"
matter entitled to deference upon review. 38
In nearly every case involving a true exercise of discretion, a figure with
authority is reacting to a particular situation and making a decision based on the
circumstances. It is in such situations that the decision maker will be forced to apply
and interpret those terms of the plan having an ambiguous or uncertain meaning. For
example, many ERISA plans purport to cover all "medically necessary" care. This
36 Even under a deferential "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review, courts will not allow
an administrator to violate a plan's plain terms. See, e.g., Yochum v. Barnett Banks, Inc. Severance Pay
Plan, 234 F.3d 541, 547 (11th Cir. 2000) ("The denial of Yochum's claim based on false and
incomplete information was arbitrary and capricious, in that the plain language of the [pllan and the
[aigreement were violated."); Swaback v. Am. Info. Techs. Corp., 103 F.3d 535, 540 n.9 (7th Cir.
1996) ("We previously have concluded that, if fiduciaries or administrators of an ERISA plan
controvert the plain meaning of a plan, their actions are arbitrary and capricious."). Accordingly, where
the plan's plain language makes clear the proper decision, the standard of review becomes immaterial.
See Davolt v. Executive Comm. of O'Reilly Auto., 206 F.3d 806, 809-10 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that
plan administrator properly denied coverage under plan's plain language regardless of whether decision
was reviewed de novo or according to "sliding scale"); Dunnigan v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 99 F. Supp.
2d 307, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("in light of Bruch, it is likely that the deferential arbitrary and capricious
standard of review is applicable here. However, I decline to reach this issue because under either
standard-arbitrary and capricious or de novo-plaintiff is not entitled to interest on delayed benefits
under the plain'and unambiguous terms of the Plan."). See also Anderson v. Trumbull-Mahoning Med.
Group, Inc., No. 99-3510, 2000 WL 331943, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar. 22, 2000).
By now, the principle is well-established that "a denial of benefits challenged under
[ERISA] is to be reviewed under a de novo standard unless the benefit plan gives
the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority .. " In this case, however,
we, like the district court, find it immaterial whether we examine the plan's benefit
determination under the de novo or under the arbitrary and capricious standard
because we are convinced that the plain, unambiguous language of the policy
supports the conclusion reached by [the insurer].
Id. (internal citations omitted).
37 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989). Without such explicit
authorization, the fiduciary would have no "discretion" to interpret the plan's terms, as a reviewing
court would examine the interpretive question de novo:
Firestone argues that as a matter of trust law the interpretation of the terms of a plan
is an inherently discretionary function. But other settled principles of trust law,
which point to de novo review of benefit eligibility determinations based on plan
interpretations, belie this contention. As they do with contractual provisions, courts
construe terms in trust agreements without deferring to either party's interpretation.
Id. at 112.
38 See, e.g., Jenkins v. Montgomery Indus., Inc., 77 F.3d 740, 743 (4th Cir. 1996) ("Federal
courts interpret ERISA regulated benefit plans without deferring to either party's interpretation, by
'using ordinary principles of contract law and enforcing the plan's plain language in its ordinary
sense."') (internal citations omitted) (quoting Bailey v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Va., 67 F.3d 53,
57 (4th Cir. 1995)); Kiefer v. Ceridian Corp., 976 F. Supp. 829, 848 (D. Minn. 1997) ("Because the
administrator acted contrary to the plain meaning of the unambiguous language of the Plan, this Court
will not defer to the administrator's interpretation."); Sigmund Cohn Corp. v. Dist. No. 15 Machinists
Pension Fund, 804 F. Supp. 490, 494 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) ("Although a fund's interpretation of its own
pension agreement deserves some deference, such construction must abide by the plain meaning of the
plan's terms. An application of the plan's provisions that conflicts with its unambiguous meaning must
be considered unreasonable and not entitled to any deference.") (citation omitted); cf Sim v. N.Y.
Mailers' Union No. 6, 166 F.3d 465, 470 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that great deference ordinarily is given
to unions' interpretations of their own constitutions, but pointing out that "courts will ignore
interpretations made by union officials which run adverse to the plain meaning of contract language").
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phrase certainly is ambiguous, but administrators are forced to resolve the ambiguity
only when confronted with a specific case, so that their reading of the phrase will
necessarily implicate a particular patient's course of treatment and will therefore be a
"mixed" decision. Plan physicians do not sit around asking themselves whether, in
the abstract, it is "medically necessary" to perform appendectomies within twenty-
four hours of identifying an inflamed appendix. Rather, they confront questions such
as, "Given what I know about Cynthia Herdrich and her condition, is it acceptable to
wait eight days before operating?" To say that only the former question leads to a
fiduciary decision reduces the reach of ERISA's fiduciary obligations to the point of
trivialization.
Thus, in the managed care context, legitimately discretionary decisions will
always, or very nearly always, resolve "mixed" questions, and therefore will not be
fiduciary decisions under the Pegram analysis. Under the clear language of ERISA,
then, the Court's analysis of "mixed" versus "pure" questions as they implicate
fiduciary duties is questionable, because it defines many non-discretionary decisions
as fiduciary, and many discretionary decisions as non-fiduciary.
The Court's position in response to this argument would appear to be that
ERISA duties apply only to discretion exercised in "the administration of a plan," and
that mixed decisions do not involve administration., But that argument begs the
question. The entire issue here is which decisions involve "discretion in the
administration of a plan" and which do not. We maintain that mixed decisions
involve both "discretion" and "the administration of a plan"-by definition, the
decisions "mix" treatment and administration-and therefore fit squarely within
ERISA's definition of fiduciary acts.
The Court sidestepped that question of statutory analysis, however. The
decision quoted the ERISA definition,39 but then failed to apply it. Instead, the
Pegram Court looked to general principles of trust law to define what acts are
fiduciary. 40 This would appear to make sense because, as previous Supreme Court
ERISA cases have pointed out, ERISA relies on the backdrop of preexisting trust law
to explain the meaning of the otherwise undefined term "fiduciary." 4' But those
previous decisions-with one notable exception-used trust law to define the nature
of the duties that attach to fiduciary acts, not to define those acts themselves. 42
The exception was Varity Corp. v. Howe,43 and the differences between the
Court's approach in that case and in Pegram are striking. 44 Varity's analysis turns
39 Pegram, 530 U.S. at 222-23.
40 Id. at 224-25.
41 See, e.g., id. at 224 (citing Cent. States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Cent. Transp.,
Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 570 (1985)); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110-11 (1989).
42 See Cent. States, 472 U.S. at 570 ("[R]ather than explicitly enumerating all of the powers
and duties of trustees and other fiduciaries, Congress invoked the common law of trusts to define the
general scope of their authority and responsibility.") (second and third set of emphases added).
43 516 U.S. 489 (1996).
44 Arguably, even Varity's reading of what acts are fiduciary under ERISA was overly narrow
because like Pegram, Varity treated the terms "fiduciary" and "trustee" as coextensive for ERISA
purposes. See id. It is true that all trustees are fiduciaries. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 1996) (defining "trust" as a fiduciary relationship). For this reason, the Court's
earlier cases were correct in finding it useful to look to trust law for descriptions of the duties to which
a trustee is subject. However, not all fiduciaries are trustees; the law defines various relationships as
"fiduciary" in nature. See Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its
Economic Character and Legal Consequences. 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1045, 1046 (1991) ("Familiar forms
of fiduciary relationships include trustee-beneficiary, agent-principal, corporate director/officer-
corporation, and partner-partnership, although courts have emphasized that these categories are not
exclusive."). For example, attorneys have fiduciary duties to their clients, and agents have fiduciary
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first to the "statutory definition of 'fiduciary' acts," 45 and then employs trust law to
explicate the meaning of the specific term "administration." Varity does not
catalogue specific trustee acts that constitute "administration," but defines the term
generally and broadly to include the exercise of "such powers as are necessary or
appropriate for the carrying out of the purposes" of a trust or plan:46
There is more to plan (or trust) administration than simply
complying with the specific duties imposed by the plan documents
or statutory regime; it also includes the activities that are "ordinary
and natural means" of achieving the "objective" of the plan....
Indeed, the primary function of the fiduciary duty is to constrain
the exercise of discretionary powers which are controlled by no
other specific duty imposed by the trust instrument or the legal
regime. If the fiduciary duty applied to nothing more than
activities already controlled by other specific legal duties, it would
serve no purpose. 47
However one defines the "objective" of an ERISA healthcare plan-providing quality
care, controlling costs or even merely ensuring that the plan's terms are implemented
effectively and fairly-mixed eligibility-treatment decisions have a profound effect
on whether that objective is achieved. Varity, then, seems to suggest that mixed
decisions involve "administration" of a plan and are therefore fiduciary acts under
ERISA.
Pegram, however, does not take the view suggested by Varity. In fact, its
discussion of whether mixed decisions are fiduciary under ERISA does not even cite
Varity. Instead, Pegram considers the fiduciary-act issue by asking what trustees
generally do in the course of their "usual business"-a seemingly broad and inclusive
inquiry, except that the Pegram opinion's analysis proceeds by listing particular
things that trustees do, and contrasting those things with MCO physicians' mixed
decisions. 48  Pegram concludes that mixed decisions have "only a limited
resemblance to the business of traditional trustees," and thus are not fiduciary under
ERISA.49 The Court points out two specific differences between trustees and
physicians making mixed decisions.
First, "[t]raditional trustees administer a medical trust by paying out money to
buy medical care, whereas physicians making mixed eligibility decisions consume
the money as well." 50 This analysis, though, focuses only on the treatment aspect of
the decision, under which the physician receives the plans' funds, and wholly ignores
duties to their principals. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2000)
(defining agency as a fiduciary relationship); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 16 cmt. b (1998) (describing lawyer as a fiduciary and specifying duties of a lawyer to a
client); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 49 (1998) (discussing client's
cause of action against lawyer for breach of fiduciary duty). The conduct of such other fiduciaries in
the fulfillment of their duties may vary greatly from the acts trustees perform on behalf of their
beneficiaries. For this reason, it is incorrect to define the universe of fiduciary acts by looking only to
things a trustee does or may do, while ignoring the fiduciary activities of, say, lawyers or agents-or
doctors.
45 Varity, 516 U.S. at 502.
46 Id. (quoting 3 AUSTIN W. SCOTT & WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 186, at 6
(4th ed. 1988)).
47 Id. at 504 (quoting GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES § 551 at 41-52 (rev. 2d ed. 1992)).
48 Pegram, 530 U.S. at 231-32.
49 Id. at 23 21.
50 Id. at 23 1-32.
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the administrative aspect of the decision, under which the physician-or, quite
possibly, a separate MCO administrator-is deciding whether and how to spend the
plan's funds, perhaps with an eye toward her own stake in any unused funds. It also
reflects a potentially mistaken equation of "fiduciaries" and "trustees." 51 Other, non-
trustee fiduciaries, such as corporate officers and directors, or attorneys pursuing
litigation on a contingency basis, commonly have a significant stake in the assets they
oversee.
The second difference is that "[p]rivate trustees do not make treatment
judgments, whereas treatment judgments are what physicians reaching mixed
decisions do make, by definition." 52 Actually, mixed decisions are only "treatment
judgments" by half of the definition. The other half of the definition holds that
administrative judgments are involved as well; that, after all, is why the decisions are
mixed. As with the first example, the distinction recognized here only holds true if
one devotes attention purely to the medical aspects of the decision and neglects the
administrative aspects, which are the very aspects that potentially bring the decision
within the purview of ERISA.
B. A BLINKERED VIEW OF THE POSSIBILITIES
As presented to the Supreme Court, Pegram was an easy case; 53 and sure
enough, the Court ultimately issued a unanimous decision with no separate opinions.
Unfortunately, the Pegram opinion did not limit its holding or reasoning to the case
at hand, but went further than was necessary or desirable. The opinion's central
argument in rejecting Herdrich's claim is that allowing such a claim would amount to
a defacto declaration that the entire managed care system is legally suspect.5 4 But
the opinion also moves beyond this basic point to address the possibility of using
fiduciary duties for review of specific acts, and in addressing that possibility, it goes
awry.
The opinion reflects an overly simplistic view of the possible forms of review
that a court might use to assess a fiduciary's decisions. The opinion uncritically
repeats the notion that review of mixed decisions would require a per se rule that any
"mixed decision"-any decision implicating both patients' medical needs and the
plan's financial administration-constitutes a violation of fiduciary duty. 55 The only
other recognized possibility is that review of fiduciary decisions would simply
devolve into the usual tort-law standard of care.56 But, as we have contended
elsewhere, 57 other superior methods for review of managed care decisions for breach
of fiduciary duty are available.
In our view, an effective system of oversight would have two features. First, it
would involve a review of the procedures and history underlying the decision, as
opposed to its objective substantive merit. Second, it would engage in a substantive
51 See sources cited supra note 44.
52 See Pegram, 530 U.S. at 232.
53 See supra text accompanying notes 27-28.
54 See Pegram, 530 U.S. at 233 ("[Herdrich's] remedy in effect would be nothing less than
elimination of the for-profit HMO.").
55 See id. at 234 ("Nor would it be possible to translate fiduciary duty into a standard that
would allow recovery from an HMO whenever a mixed decision influenced by the HMO's financial
incentive resulted in a bad outcome for the patient.").
56 See id. at 235 ("Thus, for all practical purposes, every claim of fiduciary breach by an HMO
physician making a mixed decision would boil down to a malpractice claim, and the fiduciary standard
would be nothing but the malpractice standard traditionally applied in actions against physicians.").
57 See generally Jacobson & Cahill, supra note 24.
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review of the medical basis for the decision. This review, however, would differ
from the standard tort-law inquiry in two ways: it would seek a "medical basis" that
considers the decision's consequences for the overall population, not just the
individual patient; and, so long as the decision making process survived the
procedural scrutiny of the first layer of review, it would employ a deferential standard
of review.
Such a system represents a logical and practical middle-ground position between
the Pegram rule-per se rejection of all mixed-question claims-and the strawman
alternative the Court identified-per se victory for plaintiff on all mixed-decision
claims. At the same time, this method of review would not amount to a mere
replication of state law with no real meaning other than conferring federal-question
jurisdiction to tort plaintiffs.58 Properly understood, fiduciary-duty analysis poses
questions (e.g., Was the decision making process fair and reasonable? Did the
fiduciary legitimately balance the individual against the population, instead of
sacrificing care in the name of cost reduction?) that differ significantly from tort
law's substantive, objective question about the quality of care (i.e., Was this care
reasonable, or not?).5 9  Unlike the abdication of judicial authority reflected in
Pegram, the model we propose maintains a distinct role for the courts in overseeing
the complex legal judgments and ethical tradeoffs involved in allocating medical
treatment to a general population, as opposed to determining the course of treatment
for a single patient.
Our model, therefore, would not amount to a mere replication of existing tort
remedies. Instead, it would apply in different circumstances, sometimes denying
recovery where malpractice law would grant it, other times, the reverse.60  In
addition, and perhaps more importantly, the model's focus on implementing a sound
process for decision making at the MCO level might obviate the need for litigation in
many cases.
III. PROBLEMS
Pegram's influence will likely be far-reaching. ERISA governs an enormous
number of persons enrolled in MCOs and thus, an enormous number of potential
patient claims against those MCOs.61 Therefore, Pegram is sure to have an immense
impact on healthcare litigation. In this Part, we discuss what that impact will be, why
it is problematic from a practical standpoint, and why an alternative approach would
have been better. Section III.A elaborates Pegram's likely consequences and their
potential harms. We contend that Pegram abrogates an important sphere of judicial
58 See Pegram, 530 U.S. at 235 ("[T]he formulaic addition of an allegation of financial
incentive would do nothing but bring the same [state-law malpractice] claim into a federal court under
federal-question jurisdiction.").
59 See also infra note 72 and accompanying text (noting distinction between reach of causes of
action for malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty).
60 Nor would our model supplant existing remedies; rather, it would complement them so that a
plaintiff might pursue both a malpractice claim and a claim for breach of fiduciary duty under certain
circumstances. Further, our reading of ERISA to allow a claim for breach of fiduciary duty would not
automatically entail the conclusion that ERISA preempts similar state-law claims. Plaintiffs might be
able, under our view, to bring such claims under both ERISA and state law. Cf Mackey v. Lanier
Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 833 (1988) (noting that both ERISA claims and state-
law claims may be brought against ERISA plans); LeBlanc v. Cahill, 153 F.3d 134, 147 (4th Cir. 1998)
(allowing plaintiff to bring ERISA claim and holding that state-law fraud claim based on same alleged
misconduct is not preempted).
61 See supra note 5 (demonstrating the breadth of ERISA's coverage).
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authority and will force courts, to the extent they retain authority to hear these cases,
to resolve them using the blunt instruments of state tort law and existing ERISA law.
Section III.B discusses the benefits of the position Pegram could have taken, but did
not.
A. LIKELY EFFECTS AND THEIR DIFFICULTIES
The Pegram Court was right, we believe, to conclude that MCOs' decisions
should be entitled to judicial deference. 62 As with initial agency decisions in the
administrative law context, 63 deference devolves responsibility for difficult, fact-
intensive decisions to those who have the expertise to make such decisions. This
does not mean, though, that judicial review of MCO fiduciaries' mixed decisions
should be eliminated altogether. Retention of a limited oversight role for the courts
will ensure neutral review of major legal issues and, perhaps as important, will give
the initial decision makers an incentive to generate a thorough record to justify their
decisions, thus ensuring that they will be upheld on review.
As is often the case in determining the proper role for the courts in overseeing
complex commercial activity, a balance must be struck. The Pegram Court, however,
effectively eviscerated the possibility of serious judicial review of MCOs' decisions.
The Court disavowed any judicial role in making assessments about inequalities in
the distribution or quality of healthcare, on the grounds that such issues require
expertise the courts lack and that they are properly addressed by Congress:
[A]ny legal principle purporting to draw a line between good and
bad HMOs would embody, in effect, a judgment about socially
acceptable medical risk. A valid conclusion of this sort would,
however, necessarily turn on facts to which courts would probably
not have ready access. . . . But such complicated factfinding and
such a debatable social judgment are not wisely required of courts
unless for some reason resort cannot be had to the legislative
process, with its preferable forum for comprehensive investigations
and judgments of social value, such as optimum treatment levels
and health care expenditure .... The very difficulty of these policy
considerations, and Congress' superior institutional competence to
pursue this debate, suggest that legislative not judicial solutions are
preferable. 64
The Court's strong deference to Congress sends an unmistakable signal that it does
not view its mandate as alleviating market deficiencies or inequalities.
One of the most troubling aspects of Pegram is that the Court went further than
necessary to resolve the case. The Court easily could-and should-have retained an
institutional oversight role to ensure that incentives operate fairly. Because Pegram
instead found institutional justifications to avoid such a role, it will henceforth be
difficult, if not impossible, to convince the judiciary that its excessive reliance on
institutional reasons to ignore policy issues leaves patients vulnerable and inequalities
festering.
A second problem relates to an underlying tension that may generate difficulties
62 See supra note 15 and accompanying text (noting the Supreme Court's recognition that the
judiciary !is not institutionally competent to evaluate the quality of HMOs).
63 See generally AM. JUR. 2D Administrative Law § 85 (1994) (stating that deference should
generally be accorded to administrative agency interpretation).
64 Pegram, 530 U.S. at 221-22 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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for all healthcare recipients. In effectively granting blanket immunity, at least under
ERISA, to physicians' mixed decisions, Pegram skirts profound questions about
physicians' divided loyalties in the era of managed care. By treating physicians'
incentives to contain costs as problematic only insofar as they have an undesirable
impact on overall levels of care, the Court failed to address the additional quality-of-
care costs imposed by the conflicts of interest 65 and loyalty 6 6 such incentives create.
Even setting aside any potential concerns about a physician's direct financial stake in
treatment decisions, managed care inevitably demands allocative tradeoffs between
caring for an individual patient and preserving resources for other patients that poorly
comport with the medical norm of undivided concern for each patient's regard. A
given patient's recognition of these pressures may lead her to believe that her
doctor's decision to limit or withhold care stems from a subjugation of her best
interests in favor of others, undermining the trust a healthy doctor-patient relationship
requires. 67
Apparently, the Court wanted to escape the complicated task of drawing lines
between acceptable and unacceptable incentive schemes. But at the very least, courts
can and do regularly draw clear lines to prohibit conduct that is obviously beyond the
pale, even if they wish to avoid more sophisticated and fact-intensive analysis of
closer cases. It is part of a court's traditional function to correct for market
imperfections by defining fiduciary duties to curb betrayals of trust.68  Despite
physicians' own best efforts, pressures to curb costs may lead to erosion of their
professional norm of loyalty to individual patients, making it possible that doctors'
undivided loyalty will become a commodity only the wealthy can afford.69
B. THE COURT'S MISSED OPPORTUNITY
We consider it unfortunate that the Supreme Court did not take a more nuanced
approach in Pegram. The Court should have made fiduciary duties the hallmark of
judicial scrutiny under ERISA, and thus, effectively, of any federal judicial scrutiny
of managed care decisions. A fiduciary-duty model of reviewing managed care
decisions would have several desirable features. 70
First, the concept of fiduciary duty is not a novel means of making legal
65 See Marc A. Rodwin, Conflicts in Managed Care, 332 NEW ENG. J. MED. 604, 605 (1995)
(stating that under managed care, physicians have an incentive to reduce services even when it is in the
patient's best interest to receive them and the physicians' responsibility as fiduciaries to provide them).
66 See M. Gregg Bloche, Clinical Loyalties and the Social Purposes of Medicine, 281 JAMA
268, 269 (1999) (noting that physicians owe their patients a duty of loyalty and advocacy when insurers o
try to avoid paying for care that physicians deem necessary).
67 As one of the present authors has written:
To the extent that patient trust and professional trustworthiness matter-because
they encourage patients to reveal diagnostically useful information, cooperate with
recommended treatment, and take comfort from clinical explanations and personal
engagement with caretakers-conflicts of interest and loyalty undermine the
efficacy and humanity of medicine. At best, patients forewarned about their doctors'
double agendas will be more wary about intimate disclosure, following advice, and
taking comfort. At worst, patients who put faith in their physicians' undivided
loyalty risk intimate betrayal.
M. Gregg Bloche & Peter D. Jacobson, The Supreme Court and Bedside Rationing, 284 JAMA 2776,
2778 (2000).
68 See Cooter & Freedman, supra note 44, at 1046 (noting that "courts have emphasized that
[the standard fiduciary] categories are not exclusive").
69 See Bloche & Jacobson, supra note 67, at 2779.
70 For a more thorough discussion of the benefits of this approach, see Jacobson & Cahill,
supra note 24, at 170-72.
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determinations, but an existing concept with a substantial history. The courts can
implement this concept easily and, in doing so, will be rooted in a traditional
understanding of the courts' role in monitoring commercial relations. This historical
pedigree, which the Supreme Court traditionally has recognized in using common-
law trust principles to read ERISA, would ensure some stability in the courts'
decisions from the start and facilitate the development of stable doctrines over time.
Even so, developing rules through case law would also enable more flexibility in
responding to changing circumstances than might exist under a more rigid and
precisely defined statutory scheme. In short, such a model preserves an appropriate
oversight role for the courts.
At the same time, our model vests initial decision making authority, and
especially the power to create and evaluate a factual record, in a party with expertise
in the area. In addition, disputes among the parties could be resolved in the first
instance within the managed care system itself. This would reduce litigation and
create the potential to re-establish relationships of trust between all the parties, and
focus on the ethical foundations of physicians' and institutions' fiduciary duties to
individual patients. 71 A remedy based on fiduciary duty recognizes the fact that
traditional malpractice principles fit uneasily with the managed care regime, in which
decisions affecting the course of treatment are frequently made by someone other
than the bedside physician. 72 The concept of fiduciary duty, though also rooted in
longstanding tradition, applies more readily to the current realities of healthcare
delivery.
The dissent in the recent New York case of Batas v. Prudential Insurance Co. 73
recognized the inadequacy of existing state-law remedies. The plaintiffs sought their
insurers' approval for extended hospitalization beyond the automatic coverage period
under their respective plans: for Musette Batas, so that the severe intestinal swelling
caused by her chronic condition could be monitored; for Nancy Vogel, so that she
could be observed following a difficult abdominal hysterectomy to remove two large
tumors. Both were denied coverage on the ground that further hospitalization was
not "medically necessary." Later, Batas was rushed to the emergency room, at which
time her doctor requested "pre-authorization" for exploratory surgery. The insurer
"pre-authorized" the surgery five days later-two days after Batas' intestine had
burst, necessitating surgery to remove part of her colon. Following the surgery, Batas
was again discharged, despite her physician's protests, on the ground that further
hospitalization was not "medically necessary."
Batas and Vogel sued their health plans, alleging, among other things, that their
MCOs' failure to disclose the standards by which they made determinations of
medical necessity was a breach of fiduciary duty. 74 In a 3-2 decision, the Appellate
Division affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the fiduciary duty claim. The court
held that the plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action on this ground.75
71 See David Mechanic, The Functions and Limitations of Trust in the Provision of Medical
Care, 23 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 661 (1998); Bloche, supra note 66, at 272 (discussing mediation
principles that focus on patient trust).
72 See Thomas R. McLean & Edward P. Richards, Managed Care Liability for Breach of
Fiduciary Duty After Pegram v. Herdrich: The End of ERISA Preemption for State Law Liability for
Medical Care Decision Making, 53 FLA. L. REV. 1, 40-44 (2001) (discussing significant treatment
decisions made by MCO medical directors and the difficulty of contesting such decisions via
traditional malpractice theories).
73 724 N.Y.S.2d 3 (App. Div. 2001).
74 See id. at 14 (Saxe, J., dissenting in part) (stating that plaintiffs' claims arise from a failure
to disclose "important characteristics of the plan").
75 See id. at 5.
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The dissent, however, argued in favor of recognizing a state-law action for
breach of fiduciary duty. Judge Saxe, joined by Judge Wallach, noted that other
states allow similar tort claims by insureds against insurers, usually framing the tort
as "bad faith" or "breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing." 76
The dissenters recognized that New York's similar tort claim was narrowly defined,
but noted their frustration with this fact:
What is needed is a cause of action permitting an appropriate
remedy when an insurer acts in bad faith in denying its own insured
benefits provided for by the policy. This deficiency could be
rectified by adopting the approach of numerous other States, under
which a health insurer's obligations to provide promised benefits
constitute a tort duty, which would allow for a corresponding tort
remedy.77
The dissent argued that such a tort duty could be framed as a fiduciary duty, pointing
out that the insurance relationship is often described as fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary in
character, 78 and noting that even Pegram admitted the possibility of a breach-of-
fiduciary-duty suit for failure to disclose characteristics of a plan.79 The dissent
concluded that "[w]hen we consider the nature of the health insurance industry, it
becomes apparent that medical insurers, even more than most, should be held to a
special standard of conduct toward their policyholders, beyond that required of
parties to an ordinary, commercial contract." 80
We argue that such a "standard of conduct"-whether formally styled as a "duty
of good faith and fair dealing" or as a fiduciary duty-should exist, and its contours
should be defined by reference to the model we have elaborated. Pegram was a
missed opportunity to impose such a model using ERISA's statutory scheme and its
fiduciary duties. Other opportunities, however, still remain.
IV. PROSPECTS
Pegram is a major decision, but it need not be the last word. We believe there
are three possible avenues of attack by which a sound means of judicial review,
focusing on the concept of fiduciary duty, might develop in the wake of Pegram:
through the courts, through legislative action or through private arrangement.
A. JUDICIAL ALTERNATIVES
The first possibility is that subsequent court decisions-prompted, perhaps, by
effective advocacy on the part of plaintiffs' lawyers-may read Pegram narrowly,
thereby limiting its scope. We think there is one obvious, and possibly viable,
argument that litigating plaintiffs could make to "get around" Pegram and pursue an
action under ERISA.81 The Court's opinion sometimes suggests that it is to apply
76 Id. at 11-12 (Saxe, J., dissenting in part) (citing statutes and cases from California, Rhode
Island, Wisconsin, Arkansas, Oklahoma, Florida and Pennsylvania).
77 Id. at 12-13 (Saxe, J., dissenting in part).
78 See id. at 13 (Saxe, J., dissenting in part) (citing, inter alia, LEE R. Russ & THOMAS F.
SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE 3D § 198:7, at 198-14 (1997), and 7C JOHN A. APPLEMAN,
INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4711 at 378, § 4712 at 448 (Walter F. Berdal rev. ed. 1979)).
79 See id. at 14 (Saxe, J., dissenting in part) (quoting Pegram, 530 U.S. at 227 n.8).
80 Id. at 15 (Saxe, J., dissenting in part).
81 Also possible, but less viable, is the argument that Pegrarn should be limited to its facts, as a
case involving only a blanket challenge to an alleged "inherent" breach of fiduciary duty, rather than a
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only to mixed decisions by physicians themselves. This leaves open the position that
the mixed decisions of non-physician plan administrators fall outside Pegram and
may be subject to a viable ERISA claim for breach of fiduciary duty.
Another judicial avenue of attack is the pursuit of breach-of-fiduciary-duty suits
under state law. This seems a more likely alternative and, as noted above, would
remain a desirable and important development even if Pegram had recognized an
ERISA claim, because state law is considerably more generous with its remedies. As
an example of the possibility of such an approach, we note the dissent in the Batas
case, which mapped out one version of a viable tort claim for fiduciary breach.8 2 We
maintain that state courts can, and should, review MCOs' decisions using the concept
of fiduciary duty, and that such an approach should proceed according to the model
we have outlined.
One complication, however, is that both federal and state courts have been
divided as to whether Pegram affects the availability of state-law remedies in
addition to denying a remedy under ERISA. The question is whether ERISA not only
denies plaintiffs a federal claim for breach of fiduciary duty, but also preempts any
similar potential state-law claim. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in a case
remanded by the U.S. Supreme Cpurt for reconsideration in light of Pegram,8 3 has
concluded that Pegram, in denying authority under ERISA to challenge "mixed"
decisions, also dictates-at least tacitly, in combination with prior Supreme Court
cases-that ERISA does not preempt any such challenges under state law.8 4 Some
commentators agree.85 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, however, has
refused to "read Pegram to entail that every conceivable state law claim survives
preemption so long as it is based on a mixed question of eligibility and treatment."8 6
No court or commentator has yet expressed the view that, under Pegram, state law
claims challenging mixed decisions are categorically preempted by ERISA.87 The
issue remains unresolved and requires, and surely shall receive, further examination
challenge to specific treatment decisions. This argument is, to say the least, a stretch, as it seems clear
that the Court's opinion aims to deal comprehensively with the treatment of mixed decisions by
physicians (and possibly others) under ERISA.
82 See Batas, 724 N.Y.S.2d at 8-16 (Saxe, J., dissenting in part).
83 See Pappas v. Asbel, 724 A.2d 889 (Pa. 1998), vacated by United States Healthcare Sys. of
Pa., Inc. v. Pa. Hosp. Ins. Co., 530 U.S. 1241, 1241 (2000), remanded sub nom. Pappas v. Asbel, 768
A.2d 1089 (Pa. 2001) (reconsidering case in light of Pegram).
84 See Pappas v. Asbel, 768 A.2d 1089, 1095 (Pa. 2001) ("Pegram instructs that an HMO's
mixed ... decision implicates a state law claim for medical malpractice, not an ERISA cause of action
for fiduciary breach. Thus, if [a third party claim arises] out of a mixed decision, it is, according to
Pegram, subject to state medical malpractice law.... Moreover ... it is not preempted by ERISA.").
85 See, e.g., McLean & Richards, supra note 72, at 4 ("It is the premise of this Article that in
its holding, the Pegram Court also removed the preemption bar to state law claims for medical
malpractice and breach of state fiduciary law. Paradoxically then, although the defendant HMO in
Pegram won, the managed care industry lost.").
86 See Corp. Health Ins., Inc. v. Tex. Dept. of Ins., 220 F.3d 641, 643 (5th Cir. 2000); see also
Schusteric v. United Healthcare Ins. Co. of Ill., No. 00-C-4156, 2000 WL 1263581, at *2 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 5, 2000) ("Pegram's discussion of whether the plaintiff could state a claim for breach of fiduciary
duty under ERISA § 1109 says nothing about whether a negligence claim of the type alleged in this
case is completely preempted by § 502(a) [of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)]."); cf. Pappas, 768 A.2d at
1097 (Saylor, J., dissenting) ("I agree with the majority that nothing in Pegram H requires a full
reversal of its prior disposition [allowing a state-law claim to go forward].").
87 But cf. Corporate Health Ins., 220 F.3d at 643 n.6 ("It may be that state causes of action
persist [after Pegram] only for actions based in some part on malpractice committed by treating
physicians. If so, state causes of actions against HMOs for the decisions of their utilization review
agents would still be preempted..."); Pappas, 768 A.2d at 1096 n.7 (characterizing dissent of Saylor,
J., as arguing that "ERISA invariably preempts a state law claim for medical malpractice arising out of
an HMO's mixed eligibility and treatment decision").
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in the courts.
B. LEGISLATIVE ALTERNATIVES
A second possibility is for legislative action to trump the effect of Pegram.88
This would most likely require congressional action, which might take one of two
forms. Congress could revise ERISA outright to make clear that mixed
determinations should be treated as fiduciary decisions. Alternatively, through a
"patient's bill of rights" or similar legislation, Congress could independently create
restrictions or impose duties that would give patients a cause of action for breach of
fiduciary duty. 89
State legislatures may also enact statutes offering plan participants more
extensive protection than ERISA affords. 9 0 Again, however, the authority of states to
do so is unresolved. It is possible that ERISA would be held to preempt such efforts.
C. CONTRACTUAL ALTERNATIVES
A final option relies neither on the courts nor legislative action. Parties to a
managed care plan may simply include a provision explicitly making mixed decisions
subject to fiduciary obligations, thus contracting around the limited protection of
ERISA as interpreted by Pegram. Litigation regarding such a contractual provision
would give rise to a state-law contract claim, but probably would not generate a
corresponding ERISA claim, as private parties cannot expand the scope of federal
legislation or create federal-question jurisdiction by contract. 9 t Of course, it may be
argued that MCOs would have little incentive to agree to such a provision, thereby
increasing their potential liability. It is entirely possible, however, that either market
forces, in the form of demand by plan participants, or external pressures, such as the
threat of a "patient's bill of rights" or other similar legislation, might induce MCOs to
88 Other discussions have thoroughly addressed potential legislative alternatives. See. e.g.,
David A. Hyman, Regulating Managed Care: What's Wrong With a Patient Bill of Rights, 73 S. CAL.
L. REV. 221 (2000); Jacobson & Pomfret, supra note 1; Karen A. Jordan, Coverage Denials in ERISA
Plans: Assessing the Federal Legislative Solution, 65 Mo. L. REV. 405 (2000); June M. Sullivan,
Overcoming the ERISA Barrier to Recovery Against HlMOs: Current Trends and Legislation, 4
QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 245 (2001).
89 For example, the House version of the "Patient's Bill of Rights" in 1999 would have capped
treating physicians' financial risk-bearing and prohibited physicians from receiving payments "as an
inducement to reduce or limit medically necessary services." 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395mm(i)(8)(A)(i) (West
Supp. 2001) (Medicare provision cross-referenced in proposed Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care
Improvement Act of 1999, H.R. 2990, 106th Cong. § 1133 (1999)). We offer no position as to the
merits of this specific proposal, but provide it as an indication of Congress's capacity to enact
restrictions of this type.
90 Cf Bloche & Jacobson, supra note 67, at 2776 (2000) ("Although the Justices embraced
rationing as national policy and construed federal law to permit financial rewards to physicians for
limiting cate, ambiguous language in Pegram invites litigants to argue that state law can impose
myriad constraints on medical cost control programs.") (emphasis added).
91 See Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982)
("[N]o action of the parties can confer subject-matter jurisdiction upon a federal court."). Moreover,
adding language explicitly stating that mixed decisions involve "administration of the Plan" or some
other such reference to ERISA's language is similarly unlikely to create a fiduciary duty under ERISA.
See Mabe v. G.C. Servs. Ltd. P'ship, 32 F.3d 86, 88 n.2 (4th Cir. 1994) ("A private contract cannot
create federal question jurisdiction simply by reciting a federal statutory standard."); Oliver v.
Trunkline Gas Co., 796 F.2d 86, 89-90 (5th Cir. 1986) ("We are aware of no case in which any court,
let alone the Supreme Court, has held that a private contract can give rise to federal-question
jurisdiction simply by 'incorporating' some federal regulatory standard that would not have been
binding on the parties by its own force.").
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agree to such terms. MCOs would not want to risk losing business or operating under
even harsher regulations.
This option also has its own attractive elements from the managed care
industry's perspective. One of managed care's shortcomings has been its failure to
involve the public in the desirable goal of reducing healthcare costs. Instead of
attempting to involve the public in its decision making processes, the managed care
industry has essentially forced these changes on subscribers. The predictable result
has been the much-noted managed care backlash. The managed care industry might
do well to rethink this strategy and to develop mechanisms and processes to obtain
public support for the managed care model.
The failure to involve the public extends to managed care's failure to
communicate well with its subscribers. A recent study found that communication
between managed care organizations and their members is poor.92  The authors
conclude as follows:
Not enough information is disclosed or requested, and the
information that is disclosed is not particularly clear, helpful, or
accessible. ... Denial letters rarely explain who made the decision,
the reason for the decision, what sources of evidence were
considered, what coverage policies were applied, or anything about
the process of making that decision.93
For managed care to succeed over the long term, the public must begin to accept
the need for cost controls generally and to trust individual MCOs to impose and
monitor those controls responsibly. To achieve this, MCOs could embrace
implementation of a patient advisory board with meaningful oversight of cost-
containment strategies, along with the availability of a patients' rights advocate. One
positive step toward this approach is the expanding use of independent grievance
review mechanisms to review denied or delayed care. 94 It behooves the industry to
take responsibility for consumers confused by the product they purchased, as well as
patients injured by poorly implemented cost-containment programs.
A full delineation and examination of mechanisms the managed care industry
might use to engage the public is beyond the scope of this article. Even assuming
adoption of one or more such mechanisms, public involvement may not be a panacea
for the perceived shortcomings of the managed care model. Our point, rather, is that
managed care will probably not succeed unless it gains greater public acceptance as a
legitimate means of providing healthcare services at a reasonable cost. Taking steps
to seek public buy-in to the concept does not reflect a change in the underlying care
delivery approach as much as it represents a new dimension in how that strategy is
implemented.
92 Sara J. Singer & Linda A. Bergthold, Prospects for Improved Decision Making About
Medical Necessity, HEALTH AFF., Jan./Feb. 2001, at 200, 204.
93 Id.
94 See, e.g., Eleanor D. Kinney, Tapping and Resolving Consumer Concerns About Health
Care, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 335, 352 (2000) (noting that complaints and disputes are often resolved
more quickly through independent grievance review).
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V. CONCLUSION
Only time will tell whether the Supreme Court's opinion in Pegram marked a
beginning or an end. At first blush, the opinion appears to grant managed care a huge
victory and to foreclose nearly any breach-of-fiduciary-duty suits against either
MCOs or their administrative or medical employees, at least under ERISA. In our
view, the Court's holding was unfortunate. The fiduciary concept could have
provided a useful framework for resolving the inevitable and intractable conflicts
between individuals and groups that arise under managed care. But if the federal
courtroom door has closed, the state courthouses remain open, as do the federal and
state Capitols. Indeed, Pegram's rather blunt response to sophisticated problems
regarding managed care's inherent tradeoffs might only call more attention to the
need for a thorough and balanced governmental response to these issues, in which
case the decision may well spur, rather than impede, necessary reform.
